1.1. Technological progress and its economic consequences {#s0010}
=========================================================

The exceptionally rapid pace of technological progress since the Industrial Revolution has allowed many countries and their inhabitants to reach historically unique levels of economic and social prosperity.[1](#fn1){ref-type="fn"} In the 18th century, global life expectancy hovered around 30 years, almost every other child died before the age of 5 years, average income levels were barely above subsistence level, and close to 90% of the population was illiterate ([@bib78], [@bib105]). The situation could not be more different a bit more than 200 years later. Global average life expectancy is above 70 years, more than 95% of children survive their fifth birthday, average real incomes have increased by a factor of 11 on a global scale, and illiteracy is below 15% ([@bib78], [@bib105]). Because these numbers are collective averages, they imply that some richer countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States have experienced substantially larger gains and more pronounced transformations.

Notwithstanding the positive effects of technological progress on material well-being and quality-of-life in the aggregate, some have expressed fears about the distribution of the gains among different segments of the population---in terms of high unemployment, the impoverishment of workers, and the evolving nature of work in general (see, e.g., [@bib35]; [@bib108]; [@bib40]; [@bib98]). As early as 1776, Adam Smith expressed some concerns in his book *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* ([@bib111]). While generally optimistic about the quantitative employment effects of technological progress, the accompanying increase in the division of labor could, in his view, result in a greater monotony of work and thus less pleasant working conditions.

The most prominent resistance to new technologies from a historical perspective emerged in the Luddite uprisings, which took place between 1811 and 1816 in England. These violent protests were directed against the introduction of the mechanical loom, which raised weaving productivity by a factor of more than three. The Luddites destroyed weaving machines as their main form of protest in uprisings that the military ultimately suppressed. In response to the riots, David Ricardo revised his previous view that the introduction of a new technology would, without fail, be advantageous to all. In the newly appended chapter "On Machinery" in the third edition of his book *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, [@bib102] examines the conditions under which technological unemployment can arise in the wake of technological changes. He claims that advances in the form of new machines could lead to higher unemployment over time, given that capitalists spend heavily on the new labor-saving machines and reduce the overall outlays for wages. This in turn could lead to competition among workers, reducing their wages. These changes could even lead to starvation in some parts of the population as the price of food could be put out of reach for some households. Ricardo's analysis, which remains influential to this day, led to significant contributions by well-known economists such as [@bib126], [@bib54], and [@bib107].

In contrast to [@bib102], [@bib126] views labor supply as inelastic and wages as elastic, such that reducing wages could avert technological unemployment. Wages only become inelastic when they are at the subsistence level and cannot fall further. Only from that point onward might unemployment rise, in which case [@bib126] recommends a social security system financed by the profits of capital owners---who gain from the introduction of new machines---as a remedy for technological unemployment (see also [@bib49]; [@bib56]). On top of these arguments, [@bib126] questions whether the new technologies introduced in the 19th century are always labor saving and reduce the marginal value product of workers; in fact, he expected the opposite to be true because the advances were at least somewhat complementary to the production factor of labor. This argument, however, cannot be transferred unconditionally to today's technological debate in the area of automation, as we will see later.

This brief discussion already demonstrates that the expected economic effects of technological change in general and of automation in particular depend crucially on the underlying modeling assumptions. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, the likely outcomes of technological changes in terms of employment, inequality, and overall economic growth and well-being are rather sensitive to variations in the underlying framework. Consequently, complementing theoretical considerations with empirical analyses to gauge the total effects of automation is particularly important.

If we depart from theoretical considerations that have shaped historical debates and look more closely at the data, clearly some of the fears regarding the economic effects of technological changes were overblown. As far as technological unemployment is concerned, a record number of persons are employed worldwide today and unemployment rates are comparatively low.[2](#fn2){ref-type="fn"} Furthermore, at least in industrialized countries, mass starvation has been eradicated.

The negative economic consequences of technological changes that many feared did not materialize primarily for the following three reasons: first, technological developments triggered strong growth in income levels and declines in the relative price of the goods that were produced with the advanced technologies. As a result, aggregate demand increased to such an extent that, despite the increase in labor productivity due to technological progress, the volume of work did not decrease; on the contrary, it often increased. Take, for example, the power loom that raised productivity in weaving (by a bit more than a factor of three). If the overall increase in wages and the relative price decline of textiles due to better technology lead to a rise in demand by a factor of five, then even more workers are needed in the new long-run equilibrium for weaving. Of course, this mechanism only works when labor remains an essential input in operating the looms. In general, the described mechanism is relevant for technologies that are, to some extent, complementary to labor. However, this mechanism might not be operative in the age of automation because---if we take the definition of automation seriously---it implies a perfect and complete substitution of capital for labor (see, e.g., [@bib80], for the formal definition of automation and [@bib6]; [@bib47]; [@bib52]; [@bib97]; and [@bib100], for the differences in the economic effects of automation versus other forms of technological progress such as mechanization).[3](#fn3){ref-type="fn"}

The second reason why past technological changes did not result in mass unemployment is the structural transformation of modern industrialized economies (cf. [@bib122]; [@bib123]). Two hundred years ago, most of the population was employed in agriculture producing food. Today, the employment share of agriculture in developed countries is below 5% (see, e.g., [@bib53]). Where did all that labor go? Of course, entirely new employment possibilities emerged in manufacturing due to technological changes. More important, a whole new sector emerged: labor-intensive services. Two factors drove the shift in employment away from agriculture and later from manufacturing:•The first factor was the increasing demand for services because the income elasticity of many services is well above unity since they often represent a kind of luxury good. By contrast, the income elasticity of agricultural production, in particular of food, is typically well below unity because consumers are subject to satiation. With this structure of nonhomothetic preferences, rising income levels imply a mechanical rise in the demand for services and thus, a rising employment share of the service sector.•The second factor is that technological progress raised productivity in agriculture and manufacturing such that fewer workers were needed to satisfy the limited demand of goods that exhibit an income elasticity below unity. Thus the higher productivity set workers free and drove them into services, where productivity did not rise that much (cf. [@bib15]; [@bib18]).

Based on these arguments, [@bib23], p. 23) claims that demand will always exist for increasingly more personal services by high-income earners or by the wealthy. The reason is that opportunities always exist "to make them feel better. Better about the world. Better about themselves. Better about what they have achieved." Two hundred years ago, when most people lived close to the subsistence level, the modern labor structure---wherein the majority of the population is employed in the service sector in occupations such as care assistant, nursery school teacher, nutrition adviser, marketing expert, manicurist, and yoga instructor---would have been inconceivable. People would not have been willing or able to spend money on such services when living close to the subsistence level.

The third main reason why employment did not decrease in the face of technological progress is that the production and maintenance of labor-saving machines intrinsically requires human workers. Thus, historically, one possible adjustment effect to reduce the pressure of technological progress on employment was that the producers of machines hired additional workers to create, install, operate, and fix the devices (which we call the "machine production argument"). However, the anticipated increase in automation may also lead to increased automated production of machines, robots, and three-dimensional (3D) printers. Consequently, the positive employment effects regarding the machine production argument might be diminished in the future (see also [@bib54], and [@bib75], for earlier versions of this argument).

1.2. The economic consequences of automation: Could this time be different? {#s0015}
===========================================================================

Automation can be performed in various ways. Most frequently, robots and 3D printers are referred to as devices that can fully automate certain tasks. However, automation also comprises algorithms that automate stock trading, search for precedent cases in law firms, scan X-rays, write newsflashes, drive cars, etc. The central question in terms of automation is whether this time will be different ([@bib31]): will the use of robots, 3D printers, and algorithms based on machine learning that can fully substitute for workers yield another human labor adjustment along the lines described above---or promote its obsolescence? Recent developments in full automation of certain tasks have led to the concern that these latest advances might not imply similar changes and adjustment effects as historical technological advances. The very definition of automation implies that this form of technological change does not increase the productivity of workers, but replaces them (cf. [@bib80]; [@bib97]; [@bib99], [@bib100]). For example, when autonomous cars are widespread and humans cease to be taxi drivers, increasing the demand for taxi rides will clearly no longer have positive direct employment effects.[4](#fn4){ref-type="fn"} This disables the adjustment mechanism of increasing demand for labor in the course of falling prices and rising incomes described previously with regards to the power loom. Thus the adjustment effect of increasing demand might vanish in the presence of full automation. At the same time, the new sectors that emerged in the last decade seem to be less labor intensive than services. For example, while Volkswagen, a traditional car manufacturer, employed around 650,000 people in 2017 and generated a revenue of slightly more than US\$250 billion, Alphabet, the parent company of Google, had 85,000 employees and generated a revenue of US\$110 billion. Another illustrative case is WhatsApp, which Facebook acquired for US\$19 billion in 2014 with a staff of about 50 employees. Finally, the production of robots and machines might require less and less labor input in the future due to increased automation such that the corresponding adjustment mechanism also weakens. The landing spot for those workers displaced by automation technologies is therefore an open question.

Apart from employment effects, our preliminary analyses hint at the ways automation could amplify inequality. Recent technological changes have often allowed individual innovators to make enormous profits by servicing larger markets, while the preponderance of the working population has seen no corresponding income gains. This phenomenon is called the economics of superstars ([@bib33], [@bib79], [@bib104]), the premise being that technological change and globalization have made it easier for the very best of the best in many domains (or simply those who manage to predict the next consumer trend) to flourish because they can access a much larger market today than in the past. As compared with a composer in the 18th century---whose audience was exclusively local---today's pop stars, movie stars, athletes, TV chefs, authors, software developers, and even CEOs have a global audience or customer base. The reason is that technological changes such as the Internet, streaming platforms, and broadcasting in various forms---or, a generation before, storage media such as DVDs---enabled these superstars to serve an exponentially larger population at almost zero marginal cost ([@bib68]). Extending this reach is the explosion of social media, which manufactures demand for the next buzzy product or person when mentioned or "liked" by the right influencers. A composer such as Vivaldi, for example, had to endure arduous travel for weeks to perform in a large city, serving an audience of, at most, a few hundred listeners. Today more than 3 billion people on Earth with Internet access can buy the music of virtually any performer they want instantaneously on a device they carry around in their pocket.

Apart from the economics of superstars, two other factors regarding the spread of inequality are closely connected with automation. First, the fact that robots and 3D printers are more likely to replace low-skilled workers than high-skilled workers implies that the former lose out disproportionately due to advances in automation while the latter might benefit. This leads to an increasing gap between the wages of low-skilled and high-skilled workers (i.e., a rising skill premium) and could even be responsible for the decreasing real wages of low-skilled workers observed in the United States.[5](#fn5){ref-type="fn"} As such, this increase in the gap between low and high wages is one crucial driving force of the overall rise in income inequality observed since the 1970s ([@bib11], [@bib12], [@bib81], [@bib94], [@bib95]).

Second, when robots and 3D printers constitute an important competitor for workers on the labor market---and considering that owners actually earn the income these devices generate---downward pressure is exerted on the share of labor income. The labor income share has decreased in many countries over the previous decades ([@bib30], [@bib66]), while the number of industrial robots has increased from practically zero to 2 million operative units in 2018. Thus, a negative effect of automation on the labor income share is consistent with the stylized facts (though certainly not proof of it). [@bib97] uses data from the [@bib57] to show that about 0.7 percentage points (or 14%) of the reported decline in the labor income share since the 1970s is likely due to the rise in industrial robots. [@bib29], using the stock of information and communication technologies as a different proxy for automation, find larger effects and attribute half of the decline in the labor income share to automation. Because labor incomes are much more equally distributed than capital incomes, a reduction in the labor income share is mechanically associated with a higher level of income inequality ([@bib71], [@bib94], [@bib96]).

Overall, automation seems to promise improved living standards, but the distributional consequences could be highly adverse in terms of technological unemployment, increasing skill premia, rising wage inequality, and a shift in the functional income distribution toward capital. This book illuminates the expectations and fears associated with automation from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We will see that many of the projected developments depend crucially on the modeling assumptions underlying the theoretical contributions and that, from an empirical point of view, some of the dire predictions do not (yet?) have a foundation in the data.

1.3. The social impacts of automation {#s0020}
=====================================

Of course, a purely economic perspective on the consequences of automation overlooks some of its crucial effects on other domains of society. In this section, we consider some cases where automation has the potential to instigate deep changes in our daily lives. These scenarios are necessarily speculative and, as noted previously, vulnerable to being instantaneously outdated. Modern technology's astonishing rate of change can render a notion old fashioned as it is being born.

For example, Japan was an early adopter of robots as nurses and caregivers ([@bib115]). This innovation could profoundly change how older adults are taken care of, which is particularly important in the rapidly aging populations of industrialized countries. As a first step, robots could work alongside nurses in care homes for seniors and hospitals performing physically demanding tasks, such as lifting patients and equipment, or narrative activities, such as giving exercise instructions and reading books aloud ([@bib115]; [@bib85]). However, in the long run, more profound changes could occur. Traditionally, older adults were taken care of at home, with women bearing almost all the associated burden. Then, as incomes increased and the labor force participation rates of women rose, the demand for institutionalized care services for older adults skyrocketed. If robots become more and more competent substitutes for care assistants, the way older adults live out their twilight years could transform once again. If robot nurses were able to help with showering, going to the bathroom, preparing meals, and dispensing medication, seniors could age in the familiar environment of home, without putting (physical, emotional, psychological, social, and time-related) burdens of intimate care on close family members. Technological changes might even transform childcare in a similar way, though surrendering one's children to a robot nursery school teacher may be a mental hurdle too high for some.

Although considerable uncertainty surrounds the timing of the adoption of autonomous driving, widespread use of this technology would imply another profound social change. Autonomous driving not only affects the economic prospects of driving instructors and taxi/rideshare and truck drivers,[6](#fn6){ref-type="fn"} as alluded to previously, but will also affect the process of urbanization and how cities are designed. If the time spent on driving to work could be used for more productive---or more relaxing---tasks than focusing on traffic (e.g., sleeping, going through work e-mails, watching a movie, or reading a book), commuting would become much less expensive in terms of inconvenience and opportunity costs. Consequently, living close to work would become less important, which could lead to urban sprawl, a flattening of the housing price and rent gradient, and a substantial rise in traffic. Autonomous driving could also lead consumers away from public mass transport toward personal transportation by means of driverless cars because of the convenience, solitude, and direct, point-to-point nature of private transport. This trend could be bolstered by those who cannot currently drive for various reasons (such as minors without a driver's license, older people who might not be confident in driving anymore, or those with physical and mental impairments that prohibit driving, etc.) who might switch to autonomous cars instead of public mass transport. On the one hand, these technology-induced changes could crowd roads to the limit of what they can bear. On the other hand, these technologies might also suggest self-regulating management practices, such as implementing congestion-dependent toll systems on highways and improving access to car sharing. In fact, private cars sit idle more than 95% of the time ([@bib116], [@bib117]), which implies a high demand for parking in cities; using shared autonomous cars could reduce the amount of time that cars are parked and thus, reduce the need for dedicated parking spaces.[7](#fn7){ref-type="fn"} These technological trends could weaken the upward pressure on property prices in urban areas as people move to the countryside and commute to work, while space that is currently reserved for parking becomes available for development as residential areas, office buildings, bicycle lanes, or parks, or generally reduces urban congestion. Of course, in the background, other major forces will continue to drive property prices up, such as population growth, rising incomes, increasing need for office space, and zoning restrictions.

Translation programs and voice recognition represent a further example of the potential for automation/artificial intelligence (AI) to change our lives profoundly. If the past decade's enormous progress in translation programs and voice recognition software is any guide for the future, then another possibility might be that international communication will be less dependent on learning foreign languages or hiring translators. For example, the European Union (EU) has 24 official languages, and all EU citizens have the right to access EU documents in all of those tongues. In addition, EU citizens have the right to correspond with the European Commission and receive a response in their own language. The European Commission, therefore, is one of the world's biggest employers of linguists and interpreters.[8](#fn8){ref-type="fn"} The possibility of real-time, accurate language translation by algorithms could reduce the demand for translators and lead to greater international economic integration---increases in trade, foreign direct investment, tourism, and working abroad---because language obstacles are often one of the major barriers impeding these activities.

A complex topic in the realm of technological advance is the issue of sex robots. Many news reports over the last several years have debated how sex robots will affect the porn industry and prostitution. However, sex robots could change human interactions altogether, and the legal and ethical challenges of integrating sex robots are not yet understood (see [@bib110]). Will buying sex robots be legally analogous to prostitution and therefore be banned in some countries but allowed in others? Could the use of sex robots increase individual social isolation? Could sex robots affect marriage rates and the formation and durability of sexual unions more generally? How would the availability of sex robots change actual and perceived gender roles in society? The property status of robots from a legal perspective will shape these conversations, as will the possible implementation of certain legal restrictions, such as preventing a robot from being treated in a way that would constitute a serious crime against a human. For example, sex robots can already be programmed to imitate nonconsenting victims---a simulation of sexual assault. The debate on whether this should be banned is in its infancy and ongoing ([@bib25], [@bib110], [@bib112]). Even if a solution were found, where would lawmakers draw the line between virtual reality and sex robots?

Despite the word "robotic" being synonymous with an austere and impersonal disposition, automation has made tremendous strides in psychological counseling. For example, programs have been developed to treat autism and dementia ([@bib124]). A meta-analysis by [@bib22] shows that robot-enhanced therapy has positive overall effects on the outcome of psychotherapy as compared with a control group in which no robot-enhanced therapy is used.

From a governmental perspective, military robots will be a challenge to conventional warfare because in deploying military robots, the decision whether or not to kill, or whom to kill, might be outsourced to an algorithm ([@bib51]). Some are afraid that autonomous AI-based weapons could lower the threshold of going to war, lead to new arms races, and, particularly if they get into the hands of terrorists, constitute a highly dangerous threat to society. [@bib120] cites a letter signed by more than a thousand experts, including Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking, that claims that "The endpoint of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow."[9](#fn9){ref-type="fn"} At an even larger scale, AI-based strategic reasoning in the context of military decisions is currently attracting substantial funding in the United States and in China ([@bib119]). While autonomous AI-based decision-making might allow a much faster reaction to potentially deadly threads than human decision-making, it also carries the risk of catastrophic consequences due to misdetermination.[10](#fn10){ref-type="fn"} The obvious solution to this is to "keep humans in the loop" such that the final strategic decision is always based on human judgment. Doing so, however, implies foregoing the strategic advantage of faster decision-making, and some nations might not be willing to give up this advantage.

Beyond overpowering military technologies, modern economies---in which almost all devices are connected and require stable Internet connections and reliable power grids to operate properly---are highly vulnerable to blackouts, natural catastrophes, hacking, or the spread of computer viruses. Even now, a longer blackout would prevent supermarkets from selling anything without electronic payment systems, keep electrically powered doors closed (or open and vulnerable to intruders), and disable pumps at gas stations. The stored food in refrigerators and freezers would, of course, spoil quickly without electricity, and people would soon begin to suffer as the vast majority is not self-sufficient in terms of food. As digitalization progresses, the more interconnected societies become and the more vulnerable to such disasters they become. An attack on one reflexively becomes an attack on all. This poses a significant challenge for policymakers to design emergency systems that ensure the continued functioning of society during catastrophes.[11](#fn11){ref-type="fn"}

1.4. The race against, or the race with, the machine? {#s0025}
=====================================================

How can we prepare for the economic and social challenges of automation and digitalization? One of the standard answers in this context is "preparation through education." This, however, is a convenient answer that has been workshopped to provide comfort, as almost everybody views education as positive and uncontroversial and because it suggests that we will be able to cope with anything if we are just willing and able to spend some time learning something new. Of course, education is a crucial component in the response to the challenges of automation, but it will not be able to solve all of the associated problems. Thinking that we can retrain all truck drivers displaced by automation to become quantum physicists or personal yoga teachers is absurd. That said, in terms of education, learning skills that machines do not naturally, easily, or effectively perform---such as empathy, teamwork, and the ability to interpret verbal and nonverbal signals by others appropriately (although algorithms are getting better at these, too, as we have seen previously)---will become increasingly important. In addition, lifelong learning, a well-known and widespread cliché, will become necessary when robots increasingly handle routine tasks. Finally, at least at the moment, going into STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields provides employment opportunities that appear likely to endure for the immediate future. Investing in these areas could be a worthwhile defense against the encroaching challenges of automation.

Social security systems are currently (predominantly) financed out of payroll taxes. Insofar as human labor might become less important due to automation, some argue that social security systems will have to be redesigned in response. Proposals for how to finance social security in the future range from robot taxes (or, more generally, capital taxes) to consumption taxes and digital taxes ([@bib26], [@bib40], [@bib48]). The idea behind these proposals is that robots will generate a larger part of income in the future, and thus imposing taxes on robots to replace the lost payroll taxes of displaced workers would be fair. One argument against robot and capital taxes is that capital is much more mobile than labor, such that robots could easily be used in other countries or jurisdictions that do not impose a robot tax ([@bib39], [@bib48]). By contrast, consumption cannot easily move abroad such that a higher taxation of consumption could be feasible and efficient. Of course, in this context, problems arise because consumption taxes are regressive, meaning that households with a lower income level spend a higher proportion of their income on the tax, which has adverse effects on inequality. However, some observers have suggested ways to design consumption taxes in a progressive way ([@bib32], [@bib40]). Apart from these financing issues, the introduction of an unconditional basic income---a universal wage paid to citizens by the government with no conditions---is often floated as a necessary policy measure in response to technological unemployment in the age of automation. Because the unconditional basic income is usually conceived as a full replacement of the traditional social security system, such a policy might, however, even generate economic hardship for those persons who need more than the unconditional basic income to survive. This would apply, for example, to those who are chronically ill. In addition, according to most estimates, the costs of such an unconditional basic income would be rather high, implying the need for higher tax rates or additional taxes along the lines mentioned previously.

From an individual perspective, [@bib23] and [@bib20] argue that, in the age of smart machines, a successful adaptation strategy is to run with the machine rather than against it. As a case in point, [@bib23] refers to "Advanced Chess," where each player can use a prespecified chess program and the computers on which it runs have the same performance in case of both opponents, and "Freestyle Chess," where human teams can use all types of different programs in their games against each other. While the best human players lose against most standard chess programs, a hybrid team of humans and chess programs working together beats even the best standalone chess programs. Thus, even with today's very sophisticated and computationally powerful chess programs, a certain complementarity exists between the computing power of machines and the intuition of humans, which implies only an imperfect substitutability. As a corollary, people need to seek these complementarities if they want to be successful in the age of smart machines; we should avoid trying to compete with machines in areas in which they are good and appropriate substitutes. For example, doctors may find working with a diagnostic robot like "Watson" to be a threat to their jobs. However, patients still get a large additional benefit from having a medical doctor who communicates with and cares for them. In this sense, a strong complementarity remains between the new technologies and personal skills, something that might not be the case for industrial robots and assembly line workers.

A more radical idea in the context of the race against the machine is the burgeoning notion of human augmentation. At one end of the spectrum, human augmentation could comprise smart sunglasses that take videos of the surroundings and place them in the view of the wearer, exoskeletons that strengthen body parts and make physical work easier, or implants in the form of microchips in place of identification cards ([@bib77], [@bib129]); at the other end of the spectrum, human augmentation could comprise direct brain--machine interfaces ([@bib121]). While people's willingness to undergo surgery to install these types of implants and brain--machine interfaces may seem strange today, items such as contact lenses, pacemakers, and artificial hips might also have been viewed that way upon their introduction. In addition, direct brain--machine interfaces have already been used successfully in clinical trials to allow paralyzed persons to operate tablets ([@bib91]).

Overall, the most radical prediction in this context is that of the Singularity. This prediction was first offered by [@bib72] building upon previous thoughts of John von Neumann, according to which exponential technological progress will lead to a situation in which machine intelligence will become infinitely more powerful than human intelligence. Kurzweil also predicts the eventual merger of human and machine intelligence, that is, the Singularity, at which point human life will transform (see also [@bib90], who does not foresee such a Singularity in the near future). [@bib72] main prediction is that once the Singularity is reached, human life will transform in such a way we could not now comprehend. After that point, intelligence, which could still be considered human, although it might be nonbiological, will spread throughout the universe.

However, because we do not want to speculate about what is impossible to comprehend, we will focus on the more concrete and immediate, yet still highly transformative, economic effects of automation and AI in this book.

1.5. Summary {#s0030}
============

This chapter provides an overview of the effects of past forms of technological progress and the extent to which we can draw conclusions about the future effects of automation and AI based on past experience. With respect to the employment effects of technological change, we have seen adjustment mechanisms that ensure that (some) displaced workers find jobs in other sectors of the economy. However, some of these adjustment effects might not work as well as they did in the past when full automation was not yet an issue.

This chapter also touched upon the social and economic consequences of some widely discussed forms of automation: automation in care for older adults, autonomous driving, autonomous weapons, and sex robots. While the developments in these areas are breathtaking, many challenges remain to be solved. For example, how will the legal system develop to cope with the potential arrival of sex robots and how will strategic military decisions be made in an age of automated warfare?

Finally, we discussed the possibilities of future human competition with robots. Exponential technological progress implies that the race against the machine is lost in many areas. However, racing against the machine might not be necessary; a better strategy may be to race with the machine. The extent to which racing with the machine is possible depends on how long humans will have niches in which they have advantages, such as in personal communication, empathy, and intuition. In the case of the "Singularity" predicted by Raymond Kurzweil, the notion of what it means to be human might be transformed. The remainder of this book, however, does not speculate so much about a world in which this happens, but rather emphasizes the immediate consequences of automation and AI on economic and social outcomes.

For a nonexhaustive list of articles and books showing that technological progress is the central driver of economic growth and well-being and analyzing the extent to which technological progress has profoundly changed our lives over the last few centuries, see [@bib76], [@bib7], [@bib103], [@bib45], [@bib8], [@bib9], [@bib10], [@bib58], [@bib59], [@bib60], [@bib61], [@bib88], [@bib89], [@bib63], [@bib64], [@bib69], [@bib27], [@bib73], [@bib92], [@bib109], [@bib128], [@bib55], [@bib38], [@bib24], [@bib67], [@bib50], [@bib82], [@bib83], [@bib84]; [@bib114], [@bib17], [@bib28], [@bib36], [@bib37], [@bib3], [@bib62], [@bib86], [@bib125], [@bib46], [@bib93], [@bib113], [@bib41], [@bib65], [@bib127], [@bib16], [@bib20], [@bib44], [@bib87], [@bib101], [@bib106], [@bib6], [@bib42], and [@bib35].

This does not necessarily imply that the overall number of labor hours worked are also at an all-time high because average hours worked per employee have been decreasing over the past decades and many jobs are now part time. In addition, the sheer fact of high employment tells us nothing about working conditions, wages, etc. ([@bib19]).

Of course, in reality, the substitutability between robots and workers might not yet be perfect for many tasks and sometimes substituting for human workers might be impossible. However, as we will show later in the book, most effects of automation in the perfect substitutability case carry over to the case in which the substitutability is not yet perfect.

Positive indirect employment effects could still occur, for example, for mechanics, programmers, car washers, road maintenance workers, and insurance company staff as long as these occupations are not fully automated or have not yet become redundant. An example of why these occupations might also become less important is that autonomous driving might reduce accidents such that the demand for insurance company staff and mechanics could decline (cf. [@bib21]).

For theoretical models and empirical evidence analyzing this claim, see [@bib1], [@bib2], [@bib70], [@bib13], [@bib14], [@bib43], [@bib4], [@bib5], [@bib74], and [@bib100].

In the whole process, the status gratification that some derive from owning and driving their cars could all but vanish. Together with emerging environmental concerns, this could imply a drastic shift of consumer preferences away from more polluting large cars toward less polluting small cars based on cleaner technologies, to which the car industry would need to respond.

Flying autonomous cars/taxis could also reduce road congestion by utilizing another dimension of space ([@bib118]). However, many additional concerns come with this technology, such as negative effects on air traffic safety and excessive pollution even when these cars/taxis operate with electric motors.

See, for example, <http://ec.europa.eu/education/official-languages-eu-0_en>.

The Avtomat Kalashnikova, or Kalashnikov, is also known as the AK-47, the gas-powered assault rifle developed for the Soviet Union army. Its simple and robust design renders it a cheap weapon that is widely used by guerrillas, terrorists, and criminals ([@bib34]).

See the story of Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov, who likely prevented a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1983 when he did not follow the standard protocol and instead classified an alleged first strike of the United States against the Soviet Union---that was reported automatically by an early warning system---as a false alarm.

That said, it is also worth noting that the Internet allowed delivery of massive amounts of vital information and enabled the social and economic connectivity that protected physical and mental health and facilitated much economic activity throughout the world during the COVID-19 pandemic. It would be difficult to overstate its value to humanity during the COVID-19 crisis, or its expected value during other pandemics that lurk ahead.
